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NOTE
A Day in Court for Data Breach Plaintiffs:
Preserving Standing Based on Increased Risk of
Identity Theft After Clapper v.
Amnesty International USA
Thomas Martecchini*
Following a data breach, consumers suffer an increased risk of identity theft
because of the exposure of their personal information. Limited protection by
data-breach statutes has made it difficult for consumers to seek compensation
for these injuries and penalize the companies that fail to protect their information, leading consumers to bring common law claims in court. Yet courts have
disagreed about whether an increased risk of identity theft qualifies as an
injury-in-fact under Article III standing principles: the Seventh and Ninth
Circuits have approved of increased risk standing, while the Third Circuit has
rejected it. The Supreme Court has further clouded the issue with its recent
examination of the injury-in-fact requirement in Clapper v. Amnesty International USA. This Note argues that courts should recognize increased risk
standing in certain circumstances, even after Clapper, by applying a framework examining certain key factors in data breaches. It further contends that
courts, in implementing this framework, should borrow certain elements from
the damages analysis for common law claims to prevent the prompt dismissal
of claims based on increased risk when considered on their merits.
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Introduction
We live in a world controlled more than ever before by the cybersphere.
The amount of data stored on networks has increased exponentially in recent years,1 changing the way people interact and conduct business.2 Much
of this data is personal information, which consumers must provide for even
basic transactions.3 As a result, “the intimate details of our lives”—addresses, birth dates, Social Security numbers, and credit card and bank account information—are now stored in online databases.4
Frequently exchanging personal information can lead to significant consequences.5 As the amount of online data has increased, so have instances of
computer hacking and theft of consumers’ personal information.6 Hacking
incidents aside, breaches often follow simple mistakes by employees.7 As a
result, breaches now occur several times a week.8 Indeed, a recent report by
1. Stephen J. Rancourt, Hacking, Theft, and Corporate Negligence: Making the Case for
Mandatory Encryption of Personal Information, 18 Tex. Wesleyan L. Rev. 183, 184 (2011).
2. Jessica R. Nicholson & Ryan Noonan, U.S. Dep’t of Commerce, ESA Issue
Brief No. 01-14 1, Digital Economy and Cross-Border Trade: The Value of DigitallyDeliverable Services (2014), http://www.esa.doc.gov/sites/default/files/digitaleconomyandtrade2014-1-27final.pdf [http://perma.cc/B26E-8S47].
3. Rancourt, supra note 1, at 184; Elizabeth T. Isaacs, Comment, Exposure Without Redress: A Proposed Remedial Tool for the Victims Who Were Set Aside, 67 Okla. L. Rev. 519, 519
(2015).
4. Carolyn A. Deverich et al., Into the Breach, L.A. Law., Feb. 2012, at 27, 27, http://
www.lacba.org/docs/default-source/lal-back-issues/2012-issues/february-2012.pdf [https://per
ma.cc/M8JT-KEA9].
5. See Miles L. Galbraith, Comment, Identity Crisis: Seeking a Unified Approach to Plaintiff Standing for Data Security Breaches of Sensitive Personal Information, 62 Am. U. L. Rev.
1365, 1367–68 (2013).
6. Rancourt, supra note 1, at 184.
7. See, e.g., Experian, 2015 Second Annual Data Breach Industry Forecast 6
(2015), https://www.experian.com/assets/data-breach/white-papers/2015-industry-forecast-experian.pdf [http://perma.cc/ZH93-WEUN]; Elizabeth Weise, Corporate Data Breaches Grow
‘Exponentially’; 43% of Companies Hit in Past Year, Study Says, USA Today, Sept. 24, 2014, at
3B, http://www.usatoday.com/story/tech/2014/09/24/data-breach-companies-60/16106197/
[http://perma.cc/2DDH-P7LG].
8. See Chronology of Data Breaches: Security Breaches 2005 – Present, Privacy Rts
Clearinghouse, https://www.privacyrights.org/data-breach [perma.cc/TZ9A-SBCR]. These
figures likely underestimate the occurrence rate for breaches, since they do not account for
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an organization that compiles information about confirmed data breaches
showed that the organization tracked a record number of breaches in
2014—18 percent higher than the previous record, and an increase of more
than 27 percent from 2013.9 Data breaches have thus risen to unprecedented
levels during “the [d]ecade of the [d]ata [b]reach.”10
In light of these broad risks, companies have had to fundamentally reorient their approaches to data security. Some have done just that, increasing
investments in security technology or creating data-breach response plans.11
But two factors reduce the impact of those changes on data breaches. First,
failure to frequently review and update data-breach response plans often
renders them ineffective.12 Second, new technologies present new opportunities for data breaches, and companies may not be able to properly account
for these developments.13 Moreover, many other businesses still remain in
denial about the threat of data breaches, either failing to implement any
data-security changes or making only nominal modifications.14
Customers suffer enormous harms because of data breaches, including
increased risk of identity theft.15 They have a limited ability, however, to seek
redress for these injuries or to compel businesses to provide better data security. There are no unified federal data-security regulations, so state
breach-notification statutes are the primary means for holding businesses
accountable for their role in the breaches.16 Yet differences between the state
requirements create a “patchwork” that varies by state,17 making results unpredictable and inconsistent. This statutory scheme thus provides limited
protection for consumers in the wake of data breaches.
As a result, consumers have increasingly turned to litigation against the
companies responsible for protecting their information—from retail stores
to data-storage companies—to address their injuries. These cases are usually
unreported and undiscovered breaches. Todd H. Greene et al., A Crash-Course in Data-Security
Regulation and Litigation, ACC Docket, Sept. 2015, at 92, 94.
9. Identity Theft Resource Center Breach Report Hits Record High in 2014, Identity
Theft Res. Ctr., http://www.idtheftcenter.org/ITRC-Surveys-Studies/2014databreaches.html
[perma.cc/2Q5S-9PFU].
10. Ronald I. Raether, Ten Years Later: Data Governance in the Decade of the Data Breach,
Fed. Law., Sept. 2015, at 40, 40.
11. Experian, supra note 7, at 2.
12. See Weise, supra note 7 (“[F]ew companies seem to take the need seriously. . . .
Thirty-seven percent hadn’t reviewed or updated their [data-breach response] plan since it was
first put in place.”).
13. Experian, supra note 7, at 4–5, 7 (discussing data-security problems posed by cloud
services, digitalization of hospital patients’ records, and the Internet of Things).
14. Raether, supra note 10, at 41; see also Weise, supra note 7.
15. Deverich et al., supra note 4, at 27–28.
16. Greene et al., supra note 8, at 94–95.
17. Julie A. Heitzenrater, Data Breach Notification Legislation: Recent Developments, 4 I/S
661, 663–66 (2009).
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class actions since individual consumers incur only small monetary damages.18 Consumers may assert common law claims like negligence or breach
of contract, or claims that arise under consumer-protection statutes.19 Those
claims are based on injuries related to consumers’ increased risk of identity
theft, with damages including costs for credit monitoring purchased to
guard against identity theft.20
Courts have disagreed on whether increased risk of identity theft is an
injury-in-fact sufficient to create standing, and the Supreme Court has not
yet addressed the issue. Departing from an initial trend in district courts to
deny standing based on increased risk, the Seventh and Ninth Circuits—in
Pisciotta v. Old National Bancorp21 and Krottner v. Starbucks Corp.,22 respectively—recognized standing based on increased risk.23 The Third Circuit rejected that approach in Reilly v. Ceridian Corp.,24 which the Supreme Court
appeared to indirectly approve through its discussion of future harm in
Clapper v. Amnesty International USA.25 Yet Clapper’s applicability is unclear,
given its different factual context.26 Indeed, district courts apply Clapper to
data-breach cases inconsistently,27 clouding the future status of increased
risk standing.
This Note argues that courts should adopt a framework to permit plaintiffs in certain data-breach cases to satisfy the injury-in-fact element of the
standing analysis by alleging an increased risk of identity theft. Part I examines the purposes of the standing doctrine and the contrasting approaches to
standing in Pisciotta, Krottner, Reilly, and similar district court cases. Part II
contends that Clapper, when considered in light of Article III standing precedent, simply reiterated the existing standing inquiry instead of imposing
stricter requirements. Part III identifies flaws in the current approach to increased risk standing in data-breach cases and contends that an appropriate
framework should account for these problems. Part IV then proposes that
courts—not Congress—resolve the post-Clapper split by adopting an analysis that focuses on the nature of the data breach and thus anticipates and
avoids both of the concerns raised in Part III.

18. J. Thomas Richie, Data Breach Class Actions, GPSolo, Sept./Oct. 2015, at 66, 66.
19. Greene et al., supra note 8, at 98; see also Timothy H. Madden, Data Breach Class
Action Litigation – A Tough Road for Plaintiffs, Bos. B.J., Fall 2011, at 27, 29.
20. Galbraith, supra note 5, at 1369.
21. 499 F.3d 629 (7th Cir. 2007).
22. 628 F.3d 1139 (9th Cir. 2010).
23. See discussion infra Section I.B.
24. 664 F.3d 38 (3d Cir. 2011),); see discussion infra Section I.B.
25. 133 S. Ct. 1138 (2013); see discussion infra Section II.A.
26. See discussion infra Section II.A.
27. See discussion infra Section II.B.
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I. A Split in Approaches Toward Increased Risk Standing
As plaintiffs have turned to litigation in response to data breaches,
courts have disagreed on the appropriateness of increased risk standing. This
Part examines that conflict in the broader context of Article III standing
principles. Section I.A outlines the requirements of and broader purposes
furthered by the standing doctrine. Section I.B then considers the trajectory
of data-breach cases involving increased risk standing prior to Clapper.
A. Standing Principles
Article III of the Constitution limits courts’ power by allowing them to
decide only actual “Cases” or “Controversies.”28 The standing doctrine defines who can bring suit for a particular claim.29 To establish standing, a
plaintiff must satisfy the burden of proof for three elements. First, a plaintiff
must have suffered an injury-in-fact, defined as “an invasion of a legally
protected interest which is (a) concrete and particularized, and (b) ‘actual or
imminent, not “conjectural” or “hypothetical.” ’ ”30 Second, the injury must
have been caused by the defendant’s actions.31 Third, the injury must be
likely to be redressed by a favorable decision.32 Because courts treat Article
III standing as an issue of subject-matter jurisdiction that persists through
all stages of a case,33 a court cannot reach the merits of a claim if a plaintiff
fails to show any of these requirements.34
The Court has characterized standing as “perhaps the most important”
of the Article III “limits on federal judicial power.”35 The central purpose
underlying the standing doctrine is the separation of powers—the idea that
the Constitution reflects the “common understanding of what activities are

28. U.S. Const. art. III, § 2.
29. Amanda Mariam McDowell, Note, The Impact of Clapper v. Amnesty International
USA on the Doctrine of Fear-Based Standing, 49 Ga. L. Rev. 247, 251 (2014) (citing Erwin
Chemerinsky, Constitutional Law: Principles and Policies 59 (4th ed. 2011)).
30. Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560 (1992) (footnote omitted) (citations
omitted) (quoting Whitmore v. Arkansas, 495 U.S. 149, 155 (1990)).
31. Id.
32. Id. at 561. The causation and redressability elements are generally secondary to the
injury-in-fact analysis in cases involving increased risk of identity theft. See, e.g., Krottner v.
Starbucks Corp., 628 F.3d 1139, 1141–42 (9th Cir. 2010) (noting that those elements were not
contested). Accordingly, this Note does not address those requirements.
33. 13B Charles Alan Wright et al., Federal Practice and Procedure § 3531.15
n.1 (3d ed. 2008).
34. See, e.g., Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 498 (1975).
35. Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 750 (1984), abrogated in part by Lexmark Int’l, Inc. v.
Static Control Components, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 1377 (2014) (abrogating Allen on grounds unrelated to Allen’s discussion of Article III standing requirements).
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appropriate to legislatures, to executives, and to courts.”36 Standing also allows courts to promote judicial efficiency by preventing frivolous lawsuits.37
Standing principles thus do not proscribe judicial power, but rather confine
it to areas in which courts have the most experience.
B.

Increased Risk in Cases Decided Before Clapper

Standing has been a frequent concern in cases where data-breach plaintiffs have suffered an increased risk of identity theft. Yet, prior to Clapper,
courts were unable to reach a consensus on how to treat increased risk as an
injury-in-fact within the standing analysis.
The first district courts to encounter increased risk found it insufficient
to create standing. Key v. DSW Inc.38 and Randolph v. ING Life Insurance &
Annuity Co.39 demonstrate the general approach taken by those courts. Key
involved the unauthorized taking of personal financial information of the
customers of a nationwide retail outlet.40 The customers’ substantial risk of
identity theft was neither actual nor imminent since the customers’ pleading
did not establish any risk of future misuse of their information.41 In Randolph, customers of an investment company suffered an increased risk of
identity theft when a laptop containing the customers’ personal information
was stolen from an employee’s home.42 The increased risk did not create
standing because the injury was “mere speculation” of identity theft “at
some unspecified point in the indefinite future.”43 Both cases thus declined
to recognize increased risk standing where doing so would require the court
to infer the intent of the third-party actors who stole the data and to also
assume that those actors would take certain actions to harm the plaintiffs.44
Despite their holdings, Key’s and Randolph’s discussion of third parties’
intent and actual misuse of information indicates that those elements are
relevant to the imminence analysis.45 As a result, those cases leave open the
possibility that increased risk can be an injury-in-fact in some cases.
36. Lujan, 504 U.S. at 559–60; see also Allen, 468 U.S. at 752.
37. McDowell, supra note 29, at 253; see also Erwin Chemerinsky, Constitutional
Law: Principles and Policies 60–61 (4th ed. 2011).
38. 454 F. Supp. 2d 684 (S.D. Ohio 2006).
39. 486 F. Supp. 2d 1 (D.D.C. 2007).
40. Key, 454 F. Supp. 2d at 685–86.
41. See id. at 690.
42. Randolph, 486 F. Supp. 2d at 3–4.
43. Id. at 8.
44. See id. at 7–8; Key, 454 F. Supp. 2d at 690.
45. See Randolph, 486 F. Supp. 2d at 7–8 (“Plaintiffs . . . do not allege that the burglar
who stole the laptop did so in order to access their Information, or that their Information has
actually been accessed since the laptop was stolen.”); Key, 454 F. Supp. 2d at 690 (“Plaintiff has
not alleged evidence that a third party intends to make unauthorized use of her financial
information or of her identity.”).

June 2016]

A Day in Court for Data Breach Plaintiffs

1477

The Seventh Circuit diverged sharply from those cases in Pisciotta v. Old
National Bancorp.46 In that case, applicants for various bank services submitted personal information as part of their applications on the bank’s website.47 Those applicants alleged that an increased risk of identity theft
incurred following a “sophisticated, intentional and malicious” intrusion
into the website’s hosting facility, which resulted in a breach of the applicants’ information.48 Analogizing to future harm in the medical-monitoring
and environmental contexts,49 the court broadly approved increased risk
standing in data-breach cases, stating that “the injury-in-fact requirement
can be satisfied by a threat of future harm or by an act which harms the
plaintiff only by increasing the risk of future harm that the plaintiff would
have otherwise faced, absent the defendant’s actions.”50 The court disagreed
that actual misuse of the stolen information was required to constitute an
injury-in-fact, as the Key and Randolph courts suggested.51 But the court did
not, at any point, identify limits on increased risk standing to ensure the
future injury was sufficiently imminent.52
In Krottner v. Starbucks Corp.,53 the Ninth Circuit supplemented Pisciotta’s analysis of increased risk standing. Employees of the coffee retailer
suffered an increased risk of identity theft after someone stole a laptop containing the employees’ personal information.54 The court followed Pisciotta
in recognizing the similarity of increased risk of identity theft to probabilistic injuries in medical-monitoring and environmental cases.55 But, unlike in
Pisciotta, the court also required that in order for the plaintiff to successfully
plead increased risk as an injury-in-fact, the increased risk must be related to
a “credible threat of harm”56 that is “both real and immediate.”57 Nonetheless, even though this language might have brought Krottner more in line
46. 499 F.3d 629 (7th Cir. 2007).
47. Pisciotta, 499 F.3d at 631–32.
48. See id. at 632.
49. These cases involve plaintiffs who have suffered an increased risk of future injury
because of, respectively, exposure to toxic substances or defective medical devices, or actions
that harm the environment in some way. Isaacs, supra note 3, at 536, 539. I discuss the
strength of both comparisons in Part III. See discussion infra Section III.A.
50. Pisciotta, 499 F.3d at 634 & n.3 (first citing Sutton v. St. Jude Med. S.C., Inc., 419
F.3d 568, 574–75 (6th Cir. 2005) (medical monitoring); then citing Cent. Delta Water Agency
v. United States, 306 F.3d 938, 947–48 (9th Cir. 2002) (environmental); and then citing
Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Gaston Copper Recycling Corp., 204 F.3d 149, 160 (4th Cir. 2000)
(environmental)).
51. Pisciotta, 499 F.3d at 634 & n.2.
52. See id. at 634.
53. 628 F.3d 1139 (9th Cir. 2010).
54. Krottner, 628 F.3d at 1140–41.
55. See id. at 1142–43.
56. Id. at 1143 (quoting Cent. Delta Water Agency v. United States, 306 F.3d 938, 950
(9th Cir. 2002)).
57. Id. at 1143 (quoting Los Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95, 102 (1983)).
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with the injury-in-fact requirement than Pisciotta,58 Krottner failed to explain how the employees’ increased risk met such a standard.59
Taken together, these cases suggested an entirely different approach than
the one taken in Key and Randolph. But the scope of standing based on
increased risk remained imprecise; although Krottner slightly clarified Pisciotta’s broad approval of increased risk standing, neither case identified clear
boundaries to apply moving forward.
In Reilly v. Ceridian Corp.,60 the Third Circuit split from Pisciotta and
Krottner and rejected increased risk of identity theft as a basis for standing.
In that case, employees of a law firm brought various claims against the
firm’s payroll-processing company after a hacker broke into the company’s
network and gained access to the employees’ information.61 The court held
that the employees’ increased risk of identity theft was not imminent
enough, since there was no actual misuse of the stolen information.62 In
addition, the court questioned the independent value of Pisciotta’s and
Krottner’s holdings given that they justified increased risk standing through
analogy to other factual contexts, rather than by reference to standing principles.63 The court also considered the analogies themselves to be substantively inadequate.64
Despite its clear disagreement with Pisciotta and Krottner, Reilly contained language that, as in Key and Randolph, indicated a willingness to find
standing for some claims based on increased risk. The court pointed out that
“there is no evidence that the intrusion was intentional or malicious,”65 suggesting that different facts might have produced a different result. The
court’s discussion of the independent actions of third parties also revealed
that the court might consider other factors relevant to assessing the imminence of the future harm.66 Consequently, it is not clear that the split between Reilly and Pisciotta and Krottner is irreconcilable.
II. Clapper’s Effect in the Data-Breach Context
These conflicting approaches made the viability of increased risk standing unclear. The Supreme Court’s subsequent consideration of increased
risk standing in a separate context—in Clapper v. Amnesty International
58. See supra note 30 and accompanying text.
59. See 628 F.3d at 1143.
60. 664 F.3d 38 (3d Cir. 2011).
61. Reilly, 664 F.3d at 40.
62. Id. at 44.
63. See id.
64. See id. at 44–46.
65. Id. at 44.
66. See id. at 42 (noting that realization of employees’ future injuries required that a data
thief have “(1) read, copied, and understood their personal information; (2) intends to commit future criminal acts by misusing the information; and (3) is able to use such information
to the detriment of [the employees] by making unauthorized transactions in [the employees’]
names”).
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USA67—only compounded the uncertainty created by the circuit split. Given
Clapper’s factual similarity to data-breach cases, many have interpreted it to
limit increased risk standing in the data-breach context.68
This Part asserts that Clapper did not eliminate the possibility of increased risk standing in data-breach cases, but instead provided a way to
reconcile the preceding split. Section II.A contends that the facts in Clapper
necessitated a stricter standing analysis such that Clapper did not disturb
Supreme Court precedent that considers probabilistic harm an injury-infact. Section II.B reviews the contrasting conclusions reached by district
courts applying Clapper in data-breach cases and uses Clapper to propose an
interpretation that explains the inconsistent results.
A. Clapper’s Place in the Article III Standing Framework
Clapper examined the imminence portion of the injury-in-fact requirement in the context of a constitutional challenge to 50 U.S.C. § 1881a, a
provision of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (“FISA”) Amendments
Act of 2008.69 Section 1881a allowed the United States to conduct foreign
intelligence surveillance without having to fulfill certain requirements associated with traditional FISA surveillance.70 The plaintiffs were attorneys and
organizations that frequently exchanged confidential information with clients abroad who might be targeted under Section 1881a.71 Consequently, the
plaintiffs claimed that Section 1881a created an “objectively reasonable likelihood” of injury through the acquisition of their communications under
Section 1881a–sanctioned surveillance.72 The plaintiffs also argued that the
risk of Section 1881a surveillance caused a present injury because such risk
necessitated that they incur costs to protect the confidentiality of their
communications.73
In rejecting both theories of standing, Clapper’s discussion of the imminence standard appeared to set a high bar for other injuries based on increased risk. The Court noted that the central purpose of the imminence

67. 133 S. Ct. 1138 (2013).
68. See discussion infra Section II.B.1 See generally John L. Jacobus & Benjamin B. Watson, Clapper v. Amnesty International and Data Privacy Litigation: Is a Change to the Law
“Certainly Impending?”, 21 Rich. J.L. & Tech. 3 (2014), http://jolt.richmond.edu/v21i1/arti
cle3.pdf [perma.cc/E2ST-EPB7] (examining potential impact of Clapper’s holding on databreach cases).
69. See Clapper, 133 S. Ct. at 1144.
70. See id.
71. Id. at 1145.
72. See id. at 1146.
73. Id. This type of injury is a common counterpart to increased risk of future harm in
data-breach cases. See Reilly v. Ceridian Corp., 664 F.3d 38, 46 (3d Cir. 2011) (collecting cases
in which costs to mitigate increased risk of future injury were analyzed as separate injury).
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requirement is to ensure that the alleged future injury is “certainly impending,”74 and it stressed that allegations of “possible future injury” were insufficient to confer standing.75 The Court rejected the Second Circuit’s
“objectively reasonable likelihood” standard as inconsistent with these requirements.76 The Court then repeated the “certainly impending” phrase
several times over the course of its brief discussion of increased risk,77 concluding that the plaintiffs had failed to show that the future harm was imminent.78 The Court reached a similar conclusion regarding the plaintiffs’
incurred mitigation costs, holding that whether this type of harm is an injury depends largely on the initial determination as to the imminence of the
future injury itself.79
Some have speculated that the Court’s emphasis of “certainly impending” signaled a departure from standing precedent. As Justice Breyer argued
in his dissent, the Court’s focus on the certainty of the future harm may
demand too much of a plaintiff, given the inherent uncertainty of the future.80 Indeed, a literal reading of “certainly impending” would preclude almost any claim based on fear of future injury, given the guesswork involved
in predicting future events.81 Even apart from this literal interpretation, it is
possible to understand Clapper as simply rejecting an “objectively reasonable
likelihood” standard.82 This reading would still leave little room to find
standing where a plaintiff could only show a minor increase in the risk of
future harm.83 Both interpretations would limit a plaintiff’s ability to bring a
claim without any present injury.
Clapper’s understanding of the nature of imminence in the standing
context thus seems inconsistent with previous cases in which plaintiffs established standing based on increased risk. The Supreme Court has frequently
found standing where future injury was not certain, and it has used language
74. Clapper, 133 S. Ct. at 1147 (quoting Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 565 n.2
(1992)).
75. Id. (quoting Whitmore v. Arkansas, 495 U.S. 149, 158 (1990)).
76. Id.
77. See id. at 1147–50.
78. Id. at 1150.
79. See id. at 1151 (citing Pennsylvania v. New Jersey, 426 U.S. 660, 664 (1976), and Nat’l
Family Planning & Reprod. Health Ass’n, Inc. v. Gonzales, 468 F.3d 826, 831 (C.A.D.C. 2006))
(“[R]espondents cannot manufacture standing merely by inflicting harm on themselves based
on their fears of hypothetical future harm that is not certainly impending.”). Some courts have
applied this same logic in the data-breach context. See, e.g., Galaria v. Nationwide Mut. Ins.
Co., 998 F. Supp. 2d 646, 657–58 (S.D. Ohio 2014). As discussed in Section III.B below,
mitigation costs might be the only injury that can qualify as cognizable injury. Accordingly, an
appropriate standing analysis for data-breach cases should ensure that such costs were incurred based upon imminent harm.
80. See Clapper, 133 S. Ct. at 1160–61 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
81. McDowell, supra note 29, at 266.
82. See Clapper, 133 S. Ct. at 1147.
83. Jacobus & Watson, supra note 68, ¶ 102.
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suggesting a less restrictive standard than “certainly impending.”84 In Monsanto Co. v. Geertson Seed Farms,85 for instance, farms that produced conventional alfalfa seeds challenged the government’s decision to cease regulating
a certain type of genetically engineered alfalfa crop.86 Those farms asserted
standing on the basis that their conventional alfalfa crops would be infected
with the genetically engineered gene if the deregulation were permitted,
damaging the farms’ business.87 The Court found standing based on the
“substantial risk of gene flow” caused by the deregulation.88 Likewise, in Davis v. FEC,89 a self-financed candidate for the House of Representatives had
standing to challenge the constitutionality of a statute regulating campaign
contributions where he faced a “realistic and impending threat of direct injury” from the operation of the statute, without demonstrating that such
future harm would definitely occur.90 Other cases have employed similar
phrases to describe a plaintiff’s satisfaction of the imminence requirement,91
all of which are more lenient than “certainly impending.” Clapper did not
overrule any of these prior holdings.92 Nonetheless, the Court’s preference
for the “certainly impending” standard might reflect an implicit adoption of
that phrase as the appropriate standard for judging the imminence of probabilistic harm.
Yet a closer reading of Clapper indicates that it comports with the
Court’s precedent regarding increased risk. Two key factors lessen the impact of the “certainly impending” standard.
First, a stricter standing analysis was particularly appropriate in Clapper.
The Court faced a constitutional challenge to a statute passed by Congress,
and that situation demanded a closer standing inquiry than in other cases.93
National security concerns involved in Clapper may also have necessitated its
closer inquiry.94 Finally, the plaintiffs’ fear that future harm would ever occur was “highly speculative,” as it relied on a “highly attenuated chain of
84. Clapper, 133 S. Ct. at 1160–61 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
85. 561 U.S. 139 (2010).
86. Monsanto, 561 U.S. at 146.
87. See id. at 153–54.
88. Id. at 153 (emphasis added). The Court also cited with approval the district court’s
discussion of the “reasonable probability” of gene flow, see id., an even lower standard than
“substantial risk.”
89. 554 U.S. 724 (2008).
90. Davis, 554 U.S. at 734–35 (interpreting Babbitt v. United Farm Workers Nat’l Union,
442 U.S. 289, 298 (1979)) (emphasis added).
91. See Susan B. Anthony List v. Driehaus, 134 S. Ct. 2334, 2343 (2014) (“credible threat
of enforcement”); Dep’t of Commerce v. U.S. House of Representatives, 525 U.S. 316, 333
(1999) (“substantially likely” to suffer future injury); Clinton v. New York, 524 U.S. 417, 432
(1998) (“sufficient likelihood of economic injury”); Pennell v. City of San Jose, 485 U.S. 1, 8
(1988) (“realistic danger of . . . direct injury” (quoting Babbitt, 442 U.S. at 298)).
92. See Clapper v. Amnesty Int’l USA, 133 S. Ct. 1138 (2013).
93. See id. at 1147.
94. See Jacobus & Watson, supra note 68, ¶ 100 (citing Moyer v. Michaels Stores, Inc.,
No. 14 C 561, 2014 WL 3511500, at *6 (N.D. Ill. July 14, 2014)); Scott Michelman, Who Can
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possibilities.”95 The standing analysis is more exacting when the future injury depends on an independent decisionmaker, particularly a court, exercising its discretion in a certain way.96 That concern was amplified in
Clapper, where the realization of the plaintiffs’ speculative chain would have
required multiple actors, including the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance
Court, to make certain decisions that would eventually lead to the government acquiring the plaintiffs’ communications.97 The presence of all three
case-specific factors likely led the Court to apply a more stringent standard
regarding future harm, making the use of the “certainly impending” standard less indicative of a precedential shift.
Second, Clapper’s discussion of the applicable standard for the imminence requirement reduces the significance of the Court’s repetition of the
“certainly impending” standard. The Court acknowledged that “imminence
is . . . a somewhat elastic concept.”98 Perhaps in recognition of this flexibility,
the Court conceded in a footnote that “[o]ur cases do not uniformly require
plaintiffs to demonstrate that it is literally certain that the harms they identify will come about.”99 The Court then acknowledged the existence of the
previously recognized “substantial risk” standard for increased risk of future
harm.100 Although authors have consistently recognized that this footnote
validates both the “certainly impending” and “substantial risk” standards,101
they disagree on the preferred resolution of these coexisting standards.102
The Court did not offer guidance in the footnote; indeed, the Court left
open the possibility that the two standards are functionally identical.103 But,
regardless of the exact situations in which each standard should be used, the
Court’s discussion suggests that the “certainly impending” standard was not
intended to entirely displace previous standards that were more likely to
Sue Over Government Surveillance?, 57 UCLA L. Rev. 71, 71 (2009) (“In some cases, courts
impose on surveillance plaintiffs a stricter test for probabilistic injuries than exists in the rest
of standing law . . . .”). The Court itself noted the national security concerns present in the
case. See Clapper, 133 S. Ct. at 1147 (“[W]e have often found a lack of standing in cases in
which the Judiciary has been requested to review actions of the political branches in the fields
of intelligence gathering and foreign affairs.”). For an argument that Clapper should nevertheless be read to apply broadly beyond the surveillance context, see McDowell, supra note 29, at
270–72.
95. Clapper, 133 S. Ct. at 1148.
96. See id. at 1150; see also Whitmore v. Arkansas, 495 U.S. 149, 157, 159 (1990).
97. See Clapper, 133 S. Ct. at 1148–50.
98. Id. at 1147 (quoting Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 565 n.2 (1992)).
99. Id. at 1150 n.5.
100. See id. (quoting Monsanto Co. v. Geertson Seed Farms, 561 U.S. 139, 153–54
(2010)).
101. See Jacobus & Watson, supra note 68, ¶ 101; McDowell, supra note 29, at 273; Andrew C. Sand, Note, Standing Uncertainty: An Expected-Value Standard for Fear-Based Injury in
Clapper v. Amnesty International USA, 113 Mich. L. Rev. 711, 731 (2015).
102. Compare McDowell, supra note 29, at 274–79, with Sand, supra note 101, at 732.
103. See Clapper, 133 S. Ct. at 1150 n.5.
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permit standing based on increased risk of future harm.104 Rather, the Court
needed to adapt its standards to address particular facts that demanded a
stricter standing analysis.105 Consequently, Clapper did not alter the standing
framework but only supplemented that framework in a narrow manner.
B. District Courts’ Conflicting Interpretations of Clapper
Following the Court’s own uncertainty in Clapper as to the appropriate
imminence standard, a number of district courts have reached contrasting
conclusions regarding the viability of standing based on increased risk in
data-breach cases.106 Examining these conflicting applications of Clapper
reveals a possible reconciliation of the two district court camps based on the
nature of the data breaches at issue in the cases.107 This interpretation permits increased risk to serve as an injury-in-fact, consistent with Pisciotta and
Krottner.
1. Courts Adopting Clapper’s Stricter Standard
The majority of district courts considering standing in the data-breach
context have declined to find standing based on an increased risk of identity
theft, considering Clapper’s “certainly impending” standard determinative.
In In re Science Applications International Corp. (SAIC) Backup Tape Data
Theft Litigation,108 for example, a thief stole data tapes containing personal
information and medical records for 4.7 million members of the U.S. military and their families, who were enrolled in a health care program that
contracted with the defendant, an information technology company, to protect such information.109 The court concluded that the enrollees’ increased
risk of identity theft and mitigation costs were not injuries-in-fact because
the increased risk did not qualify as “certainly impending” under Clapper.110
As in Clapper, the dependence of the future injury on a third party’s actions
made those injuries nonimminent.111 The court also suggested that those
data-breach cases permitting standing based on increased risk of harm, including Pisciotta and Krottner, were no longer viable in light of Clapper.112

104. See McDowell, supra note 29, at 273 (“Clapper is best read as only a slight shift to a
stricter standing doctrine and . . . not . . . as a major departure from current standing
jurisprudence.”).
105. See supra notes 93–97 and accompanying text.
106. See discussion infra Sections II.B.1 & II.B.2.
107. See discussion infra Section II.B.3.
108. 45 F. Supp. 3d 14 (D.D.C. 2014).
109. Sci. Applications Int’l Corp, 45 F. Supp. 3d at 19.
110. See id. at 25–26.
111. See id. at 25.
112. See id. at 27–28.
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Other cases have gone even further in arguing that the standard imposed by Clapper precludes a more permissive approach to standing. Strautins v. Trustwave Holdings, Inc.113 used Clapper to constrain the scope of
Pisciotta. Individuals who had filed tax returns with the state department of
revenue lacked standing to bring claims against the data-security company
that provided services for that department following a cyberattack, where
the injuries related solely to an increased risk that those individuals’ personal information would be misused.114 Recognizing that Pisciotta “contain[ed] no language describing the degree of risk exposure required to
confer standing,” the court reasoned that that case “leaves open by implication the argument that any degree of risk enhancement could suffice” to
show standing.115 The court deemed this low bar to be at odds with the high
“threshold of probability” required by Clapper for future injuries.116
Similarly, in Peters v. St. Joseph Services Corp.,117 a hospital patient alleged that she had suffered an increased risk of identity theft as a result of
the potential acquisition of her personal information by hackers who infiltrated the hospital’s computer network.118 The court rejected the future injury as too speculative given the number of intervening acts necessary to
cause such harm.119 The court further noted the difference between a mere
increase in risk of future harm and the level of risk required to satisfy the
“certainly impending” or “substantial risk” standards.120 As a result, the
court observed, Clapper resolved the circuit split between Pisciotta, Krottner,
and Reilly.121 As with the preceding cases, Peters thus provides a strong basis
for rejecting Pisciotta’s and Krottner’s approval of increased risk standing,
since those cases did not clearly identify the degree of risk required to satisfy
the injury-in-fact requirement.122
2. Courts Rejecting Clapper’s Effect
A number of district courts, however, have declined to find that Clapper
affected the precedential strength of either Pisciotta or Krottner. Moyer v.
Michaels Stores, Inc.123 held that Clapper had not displaced Pisciotta. Customers of an arts-and-crafts retailer alleged that, because their credit or debit
113. 27 F. Supp. 3d 871 (N.D. Ill. 2014).
114. See Strautins, 27 F. Supp. 3d at 873, 875.
115. Id. at 878.
116. Id.
117. 74 F. Supp. 3d 847 (S.D. Tex. 2015).
118. See Peters, 74 F. Supp. 3d at 850–51.
119. See id. at 854.
120. Id. at 855.
121. Id. at 856.
122. See supra notes 52, 59 and accompanying text.
123. No. 14 C 561, 2014 WL 3511500 (N.D. Ill. July 14, 2014).
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card information was exposed during a data breach announced by the retailer, they had suffered an increased risk of identity theft.124 The court held
that, consistent with Pisciotta, an increased risk of identity theft could still be
an injury-in-fact after Clapper.125 Moyer recognized that Clapper represents a
single case in a framework of cases that collectively define the boundaries of
Article III standing.126 Consequently, Clapper did not undermine Pisciotta’s
precedential value as to standing in data-breach cases.
Two cases reaffirmed the strength of Krottner post-Clapper. First, in In re
Sony Gaming Networks & Customer Data Security Breach Litigation,127 the
defendant network requested that, in light of Clapper, the court reconsider
its previous ruling that the plaintiff users’ increased risk of identity theft
constituted an injury-in-fact under Krottner.128 The court rejected the network’s contention that Clapper “tightened the ‘injury-in-fact’ analysis” in
Krottner, concluding that the standard used to evaluate imminence in Clapper was only semantically—not substantively—distinct from its counterpart
in Krottner.129 Clapper “simply reiterated an already well-established framework for assessing” imminence.130 That conclusion is consistent with the approach in cases regarding probabilistic harm that preceded Clapper, which
used various phrases to recognize increased risk as imminent enough to be
considered an injury-in-fact.131
Likewise, in In re Adobe Systems, Inc. Privacy Litigation,132 subscribers to
the defendant’s licensed products suffered an increased risk of future harm
when their personal information was acquired by hackers who gained access
to the defendant’s servers and spent several weeks decrypting and removing
that information from the network.133 The court first noted that Clapper
existed comfortably within the Article III standing framework.134 Moreover,
the underlying similarity between the imminence standards used in both
cases led the court to conclude that Clapper did not overrule Krottner.135 The
court also highlighted the relative likelihood that the plaintiffs’ information
124. Moyer, 2014 WL 3511500, at *1, *4.
125. Id. at *5.
126. See id. (“The labels used to describe the imminence requirement in [certain Supreme
Court] cases . . . sound less demanding than Clapper’s rigorous application of the ‘certainly
impending’ standard.”) (quoting Clapper v. Amnesty Int’l USA, 133 S. Ct. 1138, 1147 (2013)).
127. 996 F. Supp. 2d 942 (S.D. Cal. 2014).
128. Sony Gaming, 996 F. Supp. 2d at 960; see also In re Sony Gaming Networks & Customer Data Sec. Breach Litig., 903 F. Supp. 2d 942, 958 (S.D. Cal. 2012).
129. See Sony Gaming, 996 F. Supp. 2d at 961 (quoting Krottner v. Starbucks Corp., 628
F.3d 1139, 1143 (9th Circ. 2010)).
130. Id.
131. See supra notes 84–92 and accompanying text.
132. 66 F. Supp. 3d 1197 (N.D. Cal. 2014).
133. See Adobe Systems, 66 F. Supp. 3d at 1206–07.
134. See id. at 1213–14 (“In the absence of any indication in Clapper that the Supreme
Court intended a wide-reaching revision to existing standing doctrine, the Court is reluctant
to conclude that Clapper represents the sea change that [defendant] suggests.”).
135. See id. at 1214.
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would be misused, compared to the highly attenuated chain of possibilities
in Clapper.136 On its face, then, Adobe—as well as Sony Gaming and Moyer—
rejected the dominant trend and preserved a place for increased risk in the
data-breach context.
3. Resolution of Conflicting Approaches
The standing analyses of the cases discussed above are, at first glance,
troubling. Whether data-breach plaintiffs can bring claims based on an increased risk of future harm in a particular court depends largely upon the
standing approach adopted by the federal circuit in which plaintiffs bring
their claims—a question of geographic coincidence.137 Moreover, the continued divergence of district courts regarding data-breach standing suggests
that Clapper has done little, if anything, to resolve the split arising from
Pisciotta, Krottner, and Reilly.138
Despite this apparent impasse, the varying treatment of increased risk of
harm from data breaches may be resolvable, with Clapper providing a starting point. Even if Clapper did not entirely supplant the more lenient standing framework used in prior cases,139 the Court’s rejection of an “objectively
reasonable likelihood” standard nevertheless changed the standing framework by significantly impeding claims based on minimal or normal risks of
future harm.140 Given this narrower framework, the standing inquiry in
data-breach cases must be strict enough to weed out those plaintiffs whose
future injuries are not imminent enough to satisfy even the “substantial
risk” standard, yet are broad enough to permit the claims of those plaintiffs
who have a well-founded concern of imminent future injury.
Viewed from this perspective, Clapper does not preclude all data-breach
claims based on increased risk of identity theft—only those based on future
harm that is not imminent.141 The disparate conclusions reached in the circuit and district courts, both before and after Clapper, therefore do not reflect complete disagreement as to the legitimacy of increased risk standing in
data-breach cases. Instead, those incongruous holdings indicate courts’ uneven attempts to identify what constitutes imminent risk of identity theft.
136. See id. at 1214–16.
137. At least one author has suggested, in a different context, that the articulation by
different circuits of conflicting standards regarding standing may create forum-shopping
problems. Peter S. Massaro, III, Note, Filtering Through a Mess: A Proposal to Reduce the Confusion Surrounding the Requirements for Standing in False Advertising Claims Brought Under
Section 43(a) of the Lanham Act, 65 Wash. & Lee L. Rev. 1673, 1699 (2008).
138. See J. Thomas Richie, ABA, Data Breach Class Actions, Bus. Litig. Committee
News, (ABA Tort Trial and Insurance Practice Section, Chicago, IL), Winter 2015, at 1, 10,
http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/uncategorized/tips/blc/2015BusinessLitigationWinter.authcheckdam.pdf [http://perma.cc/7G4U-M4GG].
139. See supra Section II.A.
140. See Jacobus & Watson, supra note 68, ¶ 102; McDowell, supra note 29, at 274.
141. Indeed, Strautins conceded this point. See Strautins v. Trustwave Holdings, Inc., 27 F.
Supp. 3d 871, 878 (N.D. Ill. 2014) (“Clapper does not completely close the door on probabilistic harm as a basis for standing . . . .”).
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The factual differences between the cases on both sides of the split illustrate the fact-specific nature of the imminence inquiry and, in turn, illustrate that cases based on increased risk of identity theft can be compatible
with Clapper. In almost all of the cases that rejected injuries-in-fact based on
increased risk of future harm, the details of the breach were uncertain, as it
was unclear whether the hacker or thief was even able to access the stolen
data.142 By contrast, the cases that reached the opposite conclusion regarding
standing based on increased risk involved deliberate, targeted hacks,143 thefts
of unprotected information,144 or attempted fraudulent activity following
the data breach.145 The presence of at least one of those factors indicates that
the stolen data is much more likely to be misused, as compared to a normal
data breach.146 Accordingly, injuries based on some combination of the factors are sufficiently imminent to qualify as injuries-in-fact even after Clapper, since such facts would cause the risk of identity theft to meet the
applicable “substantial risk” or “certainly impending” standard.
III. Problems with Identifying an Appropriate
Standing Framework
This discussion illustrates that an increased risk of identity theft can
create standing in certain circumstances, even if those circumstances are
narrow. One option, given this limitation, is to determine the imminence of
increased risk using a more individualized approach relying on certain indicative factors.147 Yet the Seventh and Ninth Circuits—the only circuits to
have endorsed standing based on increased risk—found standing in Pisciotta

142. See Reilly v. Ceridian Corp., 664 F.3d 38, 40 (3d Cir. 2011); Peters v. St. Joseph Servs.
Corp., 74 F. Supp. 3d 847, 850 (S.D. Tex. 2015); In re Sci. Applications Int’l Corp. (SAIC)
Backup Tape Data Theft Litig., 45 F. Supp. 3d 14, 25 (D.D.C. 2014); Strautins, 27 F. Supp. 3d
at 875; In re Barnes & Noble Pin Pad Litig., No. 12–cv–8617, 2013 WL 4759588, at *1–2 (N.D.
Ill. Sept. 3, 2013).
143. See Pisciotta v. Old Nat’l Bancorp, 499 F.3d 629, 632, 634 (7th Cir. 2007) (“[T]he
scope and manner of access suggests that the intrusion was sophisticated, intentional and
malicious.”); In re Adobe Sys., Inc. Privacy Litig., 66 F. Supp. 3d 1197, 1214 (N.D. Cal. 2014)
(describing intentional and thorough nature of hacking incident); In re Sony Gaming Networks & Customer Data Sec. Breach Litig., 996 F. Supp. 2d 942, 955 (S.D. Cal. 2014) (detailing
scope of hack).
144. See Krottner v. Starbucks Corp., 628 F.3d 1139, 1143 (9th Cir. 2010) (pointing out
that data on stolen laptop was unencrypted).
145. See id. at 1141 (noting attempted misuse of plaintiff’s social security number); Moyer
v. Michaels Stores, Inc., No. 14 C 561, 2014 WL 3511500, at *1 (N.D. Ill. July 14, 2014) (stating
that defendant’s press release regarding breach was prompted by possible fraudulent activity
on some customers’ payment cards).
146. See Fact Sheet 17: Coping with Identity Theft: Reducing the Risk of Fraud, Privacy Rts.
Clearinghouse, https://www.privacyrights.org/fs/fs17-it.htm [https://perma.cc/ZUK2EXHM] (recommending increased password security to protect against identity theft, especially where data theft was intentional and targeted).
147. See discussion supra Section II.B.3.
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and Krottner not because of specific case-related facts, but instead, by analogy to other types of future harm.148
This Part rejects the approaches for analyzing standing based on increased risk of identity theft used in Pisciotta and Krottner, and it considers
another hurdle that any increased risk standing framework must take into
account. Section III.A evaluates the comparisons to increased risk in medical-monitoring and environmental cases and concludes that factual dissimilarities limit the value of these analogies. Section III.B identifies an
additional problem related to pleading damages for increased risk that qualifies as an injury-in-fact, and it argues that a workable standing framework
for increased risk must account for this challenge.
A. Comparison to Medical-Monitoring and Environmental Cases
Both Pisciotta and Krottner looked to medical-monitoring and environmental cases to guide their interpretations of increased risk as an injury-infact.149 But the facial similarities between the injuries in those cases and
data-breach cases only obscure fundamental differences, making those cases
poor points of comparison for future harm in the data-breach context.
Medical-monitoring cases involve presently healthy plaintiffs who have
suffered an increased risk of future harm,150 either by using a defective medical device or prescription drug151 or by being exposed to a toxic substance.152
Like plaintiffs in data-breach cases, plaintiffs in medical-monitoring cases
have not actually endured any harm when they bring suit, but might suffer
an injury at some point in the future.153 That risk gives rise to compensable
harm based on the costs of medical monitoring to prevent the injury from
occurring.154 Similarly, environmental cases involve a plaintiff’s inability to

148. See supra notes 50, 56 and accompanying text.
149. See Krottner, 628 F.3d at 1142–43; Pisciotta v. Old Nat’l Bancorp, 499 F.3d 629, 634
& n.3 (7th Cir. 2007).
150. E.g., Sutton v. St. Jude Med. S.C., Inc., 419 F.3d 568, 571 (6th Cir. 2005).
151. See, e.g., id. at 573–74; Bouldry v. C.R. Bard, Inc., 909 F. Supp. 2d 1371, 1375–76
(S.D. Fla. 2012); In re Propulsid Prods. Liab. Litig., 208 F.R.D. 133, 139 (E.D. La. 2002).
152. See, e.g., Duke Power Co. v. Carolina Envtl. Study Grp., Inc., 438 U.S. 59, 74 (1978);
In re Paoli R.R. Yard PCB Litig., 916 F.2d 829, 850 (3d Cir. 1990).
153. See Sutton, 419 F.3d at 573–74.
154. Paoli, 916 F.2d at 850–51. Although Paoli frames the future harm and the medicalmonitoring costs as separate injuries that are related to different causes of action, see id., it
makes more sense to consider the increased risk of future harm to be the underlying injury in
both cases. Sutton, 419 F.3d at 572. Clapper’s conclusion that future harm and present costs
incurred are inextricably linked only reinforces this view. See supra note 79 and accompanying
text.
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enjoy an area she normally uses,155 or an increased risk that some activity
affecting the environment will injure the plaintiff in the future.156
Pisciotta and Krottner both found these rationales compelling as applied
to data-breach cases,157 but neither case examined the specific logic underlying medical-monitoring and environmental cases. One author has sought to
fill in these gaps. As to medical-monitoring cases, Miles Galbraith argues
that the medical-monitoring remedy “perfectly parallels the costs incurred
by plaintiffs in data breach cases for credit-monitoring services: like periodic
tests to evaluate the health of their body, credit monitoring serves to ensure
the financial health of the plaintiffs.”158 Galbraith bases this conclusion on
Paoli’s distinction between future harm and medical-monitoring costs, asserting that “credit-monitoring costs are distinguishable from whatever
harm may occur in the future as a result of identity theft.”159 Galbraith further contends that credit monitoring serves as a “[p]rophylactic measure[ ]”
to protect against more significant consequences of identity theft in the same
way that medical monitoring prevents future physical injury.160 As to environmental cases, Galbraith asserts that they are reliable guides for future
harm in data-breach cases because environmental cases show a “willingness
in courts to permit plaintiffs to sustain a claim for an increased risk of future
harm.”161
These arguments, however, ignore the dissimilarities between the injuries underlying the claims in each case. In medical-monitoring cases, “an
injury has undoubtedly occurred,” and “the damage has been done; we just
cannot yet quantify how it will manifest itself.”162 Similarly, future injuries in
environmental cases are direct consequences of a defendant’s actions,163 so
the harm has, in some sense, already occurred at the time of suit. Credit
monitoring, in contrast, protects against fraudulent activity that is “a harm
but not a symptom of a previous injury,”164 since identity theft necessarily

155. E.g., Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Envtl. Servs. (TOC), Inc., 528 U.S. 167, 183
(2000).
156. See, e.g., Cent. Delta Water Agency v. United States, 306 F.3d 938, 948 (9th Cir.
2002); Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Gaston Copper Recycling Corp., 204 F.3d 149, 160 (4th Cir.
2000); Elk Grove Vill. v. Evans, 997 F.2d 328, 329 (7th Cir. 1993).
157. See supra note 149 and accompanying text.
158. Galbraith, supra note 5, at 1392.
159. Id. at 1391.
160. Id. at 1392. Such effects could include “financial ruin [or] the inability to get credit
or obtain employment.” Id. at 1393 n.197 (citing Vincent R. Johnson, Credit-Monitoring Damages in Cybersecurity Tort Litigation, 19 Geo. Mason L. Rev. 113, 130 (2011)).
161. Galbraith, supra note 5, at 1396.
162. Reilly v. Ceridian Corp., 664 F.3d 38, 45 (3d Cir. 2011).
163. Isaacs, supra note 3, at 539; see also sources cited supra note 156.
164. Isaacs, supra note 3, at 537.
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requires fraud by a third party that, while related to the data breach, is distinct and separate from it.165 Medical-monitoring and environmental claims
thus seek to remedy both future and past harms. Credit-monitoring costs,
on the other hand, only look forward to an uncertain future injury.
In addition, the future injuries in medical-monitoring and environmental cases deserve greater judicial protection than the future economic injuries
in data-breach cases. Requiring less than an actual injury in medical-monitoring cases is sensible, since “ ‘[w]aiting for a plaintiff to suffer physical
injury before allowing any redress whatsoever is both overly harsh and economically inefficient.’ ”166 Medical monitoring can provide vital protection
against irreparable physical consequences, including death,167 justifying finding standing before those consequences have actually occurred. Likewise,
monetary compensation may not suffice to return a plaintiff to his original
position in environmental cases, given the abstract nature of the future injuries,168 so declining to find standing before the injury occurs accomplishes
little.
These circumstances are not present in the context of an increased risk
of identity theft. Although identity theft can have significant effects, any resulting costs are confined to the economic sector and are thus remediable in
a way that physical or abstract environmental injuries are not.169 A plaintiff
could thus bring any claim if and when identity theft actually occurs. Claims
based on credit-monitoring costs are therefore different from medical-monitoring and environmental claims in both kind and degree; credit-monitoring
claims involve different types of injury and provide less-substantial protection than medical-monitoring and environmental claims.
Limiting Pisciotta’s and Krottner’s reliance on their comparison to medical-monitoring and environmental cases has significant doctrinal consequences. Since those cases permit a more relaxed standing analysis in certain
specific contexts,170 Pisciotta and Krottner might have intended to create a
similarly broad standard for increased risk of identity theft.171 But Pisciotta
and Krottner cannot rely on the reasoning of the medical-monitoring and
environmental cases to sidestep a closer standing analysis. In light of these
differences, a standing inquiry emerging from Pisciotta and Krottner must be
strict enough to satisfy at least the “substantial risk” test identified by the
Court in Clapper.172
165. See In re Sci. Applications Int’l Corp. (SAIC) Backup Tape Data Theft Litig., 45 F.
Supp. 3d 14, 25 (D.D.C. 2014) (noting that future identity theft depended on third party’s
fraudulent actions).
166. Reilly, 664 F.3d at 45 (quoting Sutton v. St. Judge Med. S.C., Inc., 419 F.3d 568, 575
(6th Cir. 2005)).
167. See Isaacs, supra note 3, at 538.
168. Reilly, 664 F.3d at 45; Isaacs, supra note 3, at 539–40.
169. See Isaacs, supra note 3, at 537–38.
170. See supra notes 166, 168 and accompanying text.
171. See Reilly, 664 F.3d at 44.
172. See discussion supra Section II.B.3.
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B. Damages-Related Limitation
That standing inquiry must also account for data-breach plaintiffs’ difficulty in pleading cognizable injury after establishing standing. As currently
applied, the increased risk standing analysis frequently gives plaintiffs standing to pursue claims that are likely to be dismissed on the merits absent
cognizable injuries.173 Data-breach plaintiffs typically bring common law
claims, including negligence, breach of implied contract, breach of implied
warranty, or breach of fiduciary duty.174 But even if a plaintiff has standing
to pursue such claims, he must also be able to establish the prima facie
elements of that claim, including cognizable injury.175 Showing this last factor involves more than a perfunctory reapplication of the injury-in-fact
analysis. Indeed, although the harms alleged are the same for both standing
and cognizable injury purposes, a slightly higher burden exists to show
damages.176
This increased burden has caused problems in the data-breach context:
the damages requirement has “proven [the most] elusive” to data-breach
plaintiffs.177 Courts have consistently rejected common law claims where
plaintiffs could not allege a compensable injury related to increased risk of
identity theft.178 Courts have also declined to recognize credit-monitoring
costs as a cognizable injury in negligence cases given that the economic-loss
rule theoretically bars recovery of purely economic losses through tort
claims.179 Certainly, courts should continue to conduct the damages and
standing inquiries separately so that the standing analysis retains its independent value in the judicial process.180 Yet, if increased risk claims can be so
easily dismissed where standing is satisfied, then that standing analysis has
only nominal value.
Despite these apparent barriers, courts have not foreclosed the possibility that increased risk of identity theft could result in cognizable injury.
Courts have acknowledged the possibility that credit-monitoring costs may
173. See infra note 178 and accompanying text.
174. Caroline C. Cease, Note, Giving Out Your Number: A Look at the Current State of Data
Breach Litigation, 66 Ala. L. Rev. 395, 405 (2014).
175. Isaacs, supra note 3, at 543–44; see also Cease, supra note 174, at 405.
176. Galbraith, supra note 5, at 1397; see also Patricia Cave, Comment, Giving Consumers
a Leg to Stand on: Finding Plaintiffs a Legislative Solution to the Barrier from Federal Courts in
Data Security Breach Suits, 62 Cath. U. L. Rev. 765, 778 (2013).
177. Douglas H. Meal & David T. Cohen, Private Data Security Breach Litigation in the
United States, in Privacy and Surveillance Legal Issues 101 (2014), 2014 Westlaw 10442.
178. See, e.g., Krottner v. Starbucks Corp., 406 F. App’x 129, 131 (9th Cir. 2010); Pisciotta
v. Old Nat’l Bancorp, 499 F.3d 629, 639–40 (7th Cir. 2007); Moyer v. Michaels Stores, Inc.,
No. 14 C 561, 2014 WL 3511500, at *7 (N.D. Ill. July 14, 2014); In re Sony Gaming Networks
& Customer Data Sec. Breach Litig., 996 F. Supp. 2d 942, 970 (S.D. Cal. 2014).
179. See Galbraith, supra note 5, at 1396 & n.226. But see Vincent R. Johnson, CreditMonitoring Damages in Cybersecurity Tort Litigation, 19 Geo. Mason L. Rev. 113, 122–23
(2011) (“The . . . ‘economic loss rule’ does not bar recovery of credit-monitoring losses.”).
180. See Galbraith, supra note 5, at 1397–98 (arguing conflation of standing and cognizable injury analyses prevents plaintiffs from proceeding with legitimate claims).
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qualify as damages, just as mitigation costs can in medical-monitoring
cases.181 This approach depends on whether a state recognizes a different
damages test for medical-monitoring claims, which is unsettled.182 But it is a
preferable alternative to considering credit-monitoring costs on their own
terms, since courts not relying on this comparison have either rejected
credit-monitoring damages as injuries183 or required actual or attempted
theft prior to the purchase of credit monitoring.184 Consequently, the medical-monitoring analogy provides a useful starting point for an appropriate
standing framework that has independent value, since that approach narrows the range of acceptable claims based on increased risk without preventing them altogether.
IV. Proposed Standing Framework
The complications identified in Part III demonstrate that an improvement to the data-breach standing analysis is necessary. Maintaining the law
as it is currently applied would harm consumers.185 A straightforward Article
III standing analysis is practically flawed for two reasons. First, that framework produces inconsistent results depending on the court.186 Second, it frequently recognizes standing to pursue claims that, lacking compensable
injuries, are likely to be dismissed.187 This latter barrier prevents successful
recovery for legitimate injuries-in-fact.
This Part suggests an alternative framework that accounts for both of
these problems. Section IV.A proposes a stricter, factor-based standing analysis of increased risk that merges elements from the standing and damages
inquiries. Section IV.B considers whether to apply this framework through
legislative or judicial means. The Section concludes that judicial implementation will preserve the ability to bring claims involving cognizable injury
while avoiding speculative increased risk claims that would likely result from
legislative solutions.
181. See, e.g., Sony Gaming, 996 F. Supp. 2d at 970; Caudle v. Towers, Perrin, Forster &
Crosby, Inc., 580 F. Supp. 2d 273, 281–82 (S.D.N.Y. 2008). It might seem inconsistent to
endorse a comparison to medical-monitoring cases in this context while rejecting the same
comparison in another. But the analogy here depends on structural similarities between the
monitoring and the harm in each case, see Johnson, supra note 179, at 132–39, whereas the
standing comparison depended on substantive similarities between the harm suffered in each
case. See discussion supra Section III.A.
182. See Pisciotta, 499 F.3d at 639; Johnson, supra note 179, at 132 n.129 (collecting cases
reaching conflicting conclusions).
183. See Moyer, 2014 WL 3511500, at *7 (first citing Williams v. Manchester, 888 N.E.2d
1, 13 (Ill. 2008); and then citing Worix v. MedAssets, Inc., 857 F. Supp. 2d 699, 704–05 (N.D.
Ill. 2012)).
184. See Cave, supra note 176, at 779; see also Anderson v. Hannaford Bros. Co., 659 F.3d
151, 166 (1st Cir. 2011).
185. Cave, supra note 176, at 786.
186. See discussion supra Section II.B.
187. See discussion supra Section III.B.
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A. Factor-Based Framework
An ideal framework would rely in part on Clapper’s interpretation of the
injury-in-fact requirement. Courts’ application of Clapper in the databreach context has revealed the importance of certain facts in establishing
the imminence of identity theft, including the intent of the data thief, the
protection of the data, and the attempted misuse of the stolen data.188 The
framework thus must require plaintiffs to show the presence of these factors
to some degree.
But the standing analysis should also anticipate the damages inquiry to
prevent the otherwise-inevitable dismissal of claims. An appropriate framework, alluded to by a district court considering increased risk standing in
Caudle v. Towers, Perrin, Forster & Crosby, Inc.,189 could borrow from the
medical-monitoring damages analogy and require a plaintiff to also show
that she incurred credit-monitoring costs because she had a rational basis
for fearing that her data would be misused.190 Courts would have to individually evaluate the rationality of a plaintiff’s fear based on several factors,
including:
(1) the of lack [sic] any password-protection for use of the computer such
that an unsophisticated user could boot the computer and immediately
access the file; (2) that the person stealing the hard drive was motivated by
a desire to access the data and had the capabilities to do so; or (3) actual
access or misuse of information of the plaintiff or another person whose
data was stored on the same hard drive.191

These factors would impose a greater burden on the plaintiff to demonstrate
a reasonable fear of future injury at an earlier stage. This mixing of the
standing and damages tests is appropriate here given the similar factors involved in each inquiry, and the reality that “consideration of injury for
standing purposes inherently implicates weighing the merits of the claim.”192
Adopting a form of the Caudle framework at the standing stage would also
increase the likelihood of success after establishing standing, since plaintiffs
who meet this stricter test would be well-positioned to have their creditmonitoring costs qualify as compensable injuries.
188. See discussion supra Section II.B.3; see also supra note 66 (outlining factors discussed
in Reilly v. Ceridian Corp. to make alleged injury imminent). One author has identified Reilly’s
factors as reflecting the Third Circuit’s standing requirements. See Isaacs, supra note 3, at 555.
But Reilly did not indicate that every data-breach plaintiff must show these facts to establish
standing; it observed only the conditions necessary for plaintiffs’ future injuries to occur. See
Reilly v. Ceridian Corp., 664 F.3d 38, 42 (3d Cir. 2011). Nonetheless, I agree with Isaacs that
those factors are important given their similarity to the common factors I have identified
above.
189. 580 F. Supp. 2d 273 (S.D.N.Y. 2008).
190. Caudle, 580 F. Supp. 2d at 282.
191. Id.
192. Cave, supra note 176, at 787 (footnote omitted); see also William A. Fletcher, The
Structure of Standing, 98 Yale L.J. 221, 238–39 (1988) (discussing ways in which “standing
determinations are actually determinations on the merits”).
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B. Preferred Method of Implementation
Nonetheless, this standing analysis lacks value if not appropriately implemented. Solutions will likely come from either judicial or legislative action.193 Several authors who have examined the fractured state of increased
risk standing, including Patricia Cave and Elizabeth Isaacs, have endorsed
the passage of a federal statute creating a private right of action establishing
standing for increased risk of identity theft.194 Cave’s and Isaacs’s
frameworks—the two most detailed proposals—are largely similar: both envision a broader role for the Federal Trade Commission in establishing and
enforcing data management standards,195 and both identify credit-monitoring expenses as the only recoverable damages.196 But Isaacs clarifies the ambiguities of Cave’s outline by suggesting both reliance on the Reilly factors197
to narrow the types of data breaches for which a private right of action is
available,198 and limiting recovery to actual, reasonable costs for credit
monitoring.199
The benefits of these statutory solutions are clear. The existence of clear
federal guidelines would better standardize businesses’ data privacy practices, and the existence of statutory remedies would incentivize compliance.200 In addition, federal legislation could replace the gaps that plague
states’ approaches to damages for increased risk of identity theft, and it
would resolve the inconsistencies as to standing inquiries in data-breach
cases.201
These legislative proposals, however, ignore the political realities that
make passage of this or similar legislation unlikely. The content and specificity of any legislation would “depend heavily on policy preferences,” such
that it could be drafted in either businesses’ or consumers’ favor.202 Yet Congress’s approach to data security has consistently suffered from bipartisan
193. See Isaacs, supra note 3, at 553–54.
194. Cave, supra note 176, at 789–93; Cease, supra note 174, at 420–21; Isaacs, supra note
3, at 554–57.
195. See Cave, supra note 176, at 790–91; Isaacs, supra note 3, at 557.
196. See Cave, supra note 176, at 793; Isaacs, supra note 3, at 556.
197. See Reilly v. Ceridian Corp., 664 F.3d 38, 42 (3d Cir. 2011) (noting that future injury
required that data thief “(1) read, copied, and understood [plaintiffs’] personal information;
(2) intends to commit future criminal acts by misusing the information; and (3) is able to use
such information to the detriment of [plaintiffs] by making unauthorized transactions in
[their] names”).
198. See Isaacs, supra note 3, at 555.
199. Id. at 556. Isaacs proposes consideration of several factors in determining reasonableness, including the type of data compromised, the amount the plaintiff stands to lose, and a
plaintiff’s actions with respect to a defendant’s offer, if any, to pay for the credit monitoring.
Id.
200. See id. at 554.
201. See Cave, supra note 176, at 787–89; see also discussion supra Sections II.B (standing)
& III.B (damages).
202. Cease, supra note 174, at 421.
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disagreement that has defeated, for instance, numerous bills that would have
imposed stricter requirements on businesses to notify consumers following a
data breach.203 Moreover, even if a bill were to pass, states’ different approaches and legislators’ policy preferences would likely decrease its effectiveness.204 These problems suggest that a legislative approach might not
adequately address the current issues with increased risk standing.
Judicial adoption of the framework discussed above is therefore the
preferable implementation method. Cave’s objection to judicial resolution
depends on the assumption that, to find standing and damages based on
increased risk of identity theft, courts would have to substantively change
the law.205 But this belief is mistaken; permitting claims based on increased
risk is consistent with traditional standing and damages principles.206 Indeed, the tests that Isaacs outlines for inclusion in data-breach legislation
strongly resemble those that this Note has articulated, which themselves
arise from various courts’ applications of standing and damages doctrines.207
In addition, the concern over inconsistent standing and damages law is mitigated by a reframing of the circuit split as to increased risk standing208 and
the existing support for credit-monitoring damages by analogy to medicalmonitoring claims.209 These interpretations, although limited in their application thus far, provide an adequate foundation from which courts can
shape their understanding of increased risk of identity theft as a basis for
standing.
Moreover, leaving the ultimate resolution of increased risk standing to
courts instead of legislatures better serves Article III’s main purposes.210 Because modifying the standing analysis to better account for claims based on
increased risk of identity theft does not require a substantive change to the
law,211 the judiciary is just as capable as the legislature of properly effectuating this adjustment, negating any separation-of-powers concern. Furthermore, allowing courts to structure the proposed framework gives courts
more flexibility in determining imminence on a case-by-case basis. The judicial-efficiency principle seeks to avoid an abundance of frivolous lawsuits.212
203. Rachael M. Peters, Note, So You’ve Been Notified, Now What? The Problem with Current Data-Breach Notification Laws, 56 Ariz. L. Rev. 1171, 1195–96 (2014) (citing Christin
McMeley, Federal Data Breach Legislation Introduced, but Will It Go Anywhere?, JD Supra Bus.
Advisor (June 25, 2013), http://www.jdsupra.com/legalnews/federal-data-breach-legislationintroduc-74498 [http://perma.cc/34S4-W9N5]); see also Cave, supra note 176, at 780 & n.104
(citing “numerous” failed “comprehensive data privacy bills”).
204. See infra notes 213–214 and accompanying text.
205. See Cave, supra note 176, at 785–87.
206. See discussion supra Sections II.B.3, III.B.
207. Compare supra notes 198–199 and accompanying text, with supra notes 188–191 and
accompanying text.
208. See discussion supra Section II.B.3.
209. See discussion supra Section III.B.
210. See supra notes 36–37 and accompanying text.
211. See discussion supra Sections II.B.3, III.B.
212. See sources cited supra note 37.
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Any statute regarding data-breach standing would have to be broadly drafted
given the wide range of state approaches to data breaches213 and the broad
spectrum of legislators’ policy preferences.214 As a result, a legislative solution would not improve upon Pisciotta’s and Krottner’s improperly broad
approach to increased risk of identity theft.215 Giving courts the power to
develop this framework would allow them to more effectively reject claims
based on future injury that is not imminent enough to create Article III
standing.
Conclusion
Given the increasing rate of data breaches and the failure of companies
to appropriately respond, consumers will continue to suffer increased risks
of identity theft when their personal information is exposed. Because current consumer-protection statutes do not provide adequate response mechanisms for data breaches, consumers must use the judicial system to hold
companies responsible for their role in causing those injuries. Although Pisciotta and Krottner reached the right result in recognizing standing based on
increased risk, their approach must be narrowed to allow only those claims
that are most likely—because of their underlying facts—to satisfy both
standing and damages inquiries. Applying this narrowed standing framework through courts alone will avoid the overexpansion of increased risk
claims and respect the dual purposes on which the standing doctrine rests.

213. See BakerHostetler, State Data Breach Law Summary (2015), http://www.baker
law.com/files/Uploads/Documents/Data%20Breach%20documents/State_Data_Breach_Statute
_Form.pdf [http://perma.cc/PX2Y-RRLX].
214. See supra note 202 and accompanying text.
215. See supra notes 170–171 and accompanying text.

